Post financial crisis, audit committee (AC) reforms are proposed to improve the quality of financial reporting (EC 2011; Competition Commission 2013). This paper's empirical contribution is to investigate the extent to which ACs and audit committee chairs (ACCs) engage with chief financial officers (CFOs) and audit partners (APs) across a range of 32 financial reporting issues. It is the first large-scale survey of interactions to move beyond the micro CFO / AP dyad and to distinguish the individual ACC from the AC group. While 37% of the 5,445 reported discussions involve all three key individuals together with the full AC, 35% involve neither the AC nor the ACC and the ACC acts without the full AC in a significant minority of cases. The parties reported to be involved are similar across the three respondent groups but vary with financial reporting issue, company size and audit firm size. The paper's theoretical contribution is to interpret the evidence using the concepts of boundary spanning and gatekeeping roles. The research reveals incomplete levels of AC and ACC engagement with financial reporting issues. Findings have implications for policymakers regarding the role, influence and effectiveness of the AC in financial reporting matters. Directions for future research are identified.
INTRODUCTION
Following the banking crisis, regulatory reforms relating to corporate governance, financial reporting and the role of auditors are currently being considered in various national and supranational jurisdictions. In relation specifically to audit committees (ACs), the EC is proposing a regulation to mandate engagement by auditors with audit committees (ACs) in EU public interest entities regarding audit and financial reporting issues (EC 2011, para. 23 ). In the UK, the Competition Commission, in its statutory investigation of the audit market, concluded that the accountability of the external auditor to the AC should be strengthened as one of seven remedies for the adverse effect of high concentration on competition (Competition Commission 2013, pp. 265-274) .
Further, the UK Corporate Governance Code contains a new requirement (to come into effect in late 2013) for AC reports to give a description of significant issues considered by the AC in relation to the financial statements and how these issues were addressed (FRC 2012) . These reforms all focus on the engagement of the AC as a means to improve the quality of financial reporting.
In recent years, a major influence on AC regimes in many countries was the passing of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 which instituted mandatory reforms designed to restore confidence in US corporate governance, financial reporting and auditing after the Enron scandal and the collapse of Andersen. SOX provisions impacted entities beyond the US since they also applied to foreign subsidiaries and foreign registrants with US listings and came to be viewed as best practice. A key feature of SOX was to mandate the strengthening of the role of the AC in its engagement with auditors in financial reporting and auditing issues and also to mandate the engagement of auditors with the AC. The influence of SOX led to changes in AC regimes throughout the EU and particularly in the UK (Smith Committee 2003) .
Comparative studies of AC practices in the EU suggest that there are significant differences in AC regimes, particularly between what is referred to as the Anglo-Saxon market-based governance model and the continental European / Japanese insider stakeholder model (Collier and Zaman 2005, Cicon et al. 2012) . The market-based approach is short-term and shareholder-centric, whereas the insider stakeholder model adopts a longer-term view and is responsive to diverse interests and accountabilities (García-Castro et al. 2013) . Some evidence is emerging within the EU of a move towards the Anglo-Saxon US / UK style regime for ACs; a model which draws mainly on the US model (Kumar and Zattoni 2013) . However the extent of the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model varies significantly between EU countries (Coffee 2006 , Oxley 2007 , Quick et al. 2007 ).
The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the group accounts of all EU listed companies from 2005 resulted in a more technically complex accounting regime for listed companies, placing considerable strain on ACs, audit committee chairs (ACCs), chief financial officers (CFOs) and audit partners (APs) (Beattie Fearnley and Hines. 2011 (hereafter BFH) , ch.16). It is now widely recognised that the engagement of the AC with the financial reporting and auditing process has changed (e.g. Sabia and Goodfellow 2005 , KPMG 2006 , 2013a . ACs have emerged as a key influence in the financial reporting process, although there has been relatively little research about the actual level of engagement between the key parties.
While small-sample case studies have been carried out in the UK by Turley and Zaman (2007) and BFH, in Canada by Gendron and Bédard (2006) and in Malaysia by Salleh and Stewart (2012) , to date there has been no large-scale study of AC engagement specifically regarding crucial financial reporting issues. This is particularly desirable given that Beattie et al. (2012) investigated the level of involvement of key parties in relation to a range of audit-related issues and found evidence of less than full AC engagement.
In their review of auditor-client interaction research, Nelson and Tan (2005, p.58) call for research that recognises that practice has changed 'to involve audit committees and various forms of regulatory oversight to a greater extent'. This paper responds to this call by undertaking a wide ranging experiential questionnaire survey of the three principal parties in the financial reporting interaction process. Previous questionnaire studies have focussed only on the micro CFO / AP dyad (see, for example, Beattie et al. (2000) in the UK and Gibbins et al. (2007) in Canada). The present survey was conducted in the 2007 UK regulatory environment, which is fundamentally unchanged at the present time.
1 It complements the limited extant case study research on the CFO / AP / AC triad previously undertaken by providing large scale data suitable for statistical analysis and permitting generalisation. The paper is situated at the juncture of the financial reporting interaction literature (which largely ignores the role of ACs) and the AC literature (which focusses on inputs and outputs and largely ignores process aspects).
Our research questions concern the financial statement issues which are the subject of discussions between CFOs, APs and / or ACCs. AC engagement in these discussions is conceived as a two-stage process: awareness and involvement. Awareness is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for involvement. First, we explore the extent to which the ACCs' level of awareness of financial reporting interaction issues (both generally and with respect to specific issues) is similar to the other two respondent groups (APs and CFOs). Second, we examine the extent to which the ACC and the full AC are routinely involved in discussions related to the production of financial statements. Finally, we investigate the extent to which factors such as financial reporting issue, company size and audit firm tier impact upon the engagement of the parties in the interactions.
The primary empirical contribution of the paper is to provide the first large-sample evidence of the extent to which ACs are engaged in financial reporting issues in the post-SOX, Anglo-Saxon corporate governance environment. There are two important secondary empirical contributions: (i) the engagement of the ACC is considered separately from the full AC and (ii) contextual factors that may influence the extent of engagement are explored. Given the key role of ACs in proposed regulatory change, this evidence offers a valuable baseline for future academic research and policy-making. The theoretical contribution of the paper is to highlight the role of the ACC (and the AC) as boundary spanners and gatekeepers, constructs drawn from the organisational studies literature. To our knowledge, the only study to date to characterise the AC in this way is Seabright et al. (1992) , who focus on the issue of auditor-client realignments. This paper will inform national and supranational regulators who are currently considering further changes to AC regimes in respect of AC engagement with financial reporting issues.
The extent of AC engagement in this core area of an AC's remit provides new insights into a key aspect of AC effectiveness under the UK Anglo-Saxon style governance regime. Our findings respond to the growing call for evidence-based policy making that assesses the effects of financial regulation (e.g. Buijink 2006 interactions. Section three develops research questions, section four discusses the methods used in the study, section five presents results and discussion, and section six summarises and concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Development of the UK corporate governance framework
The UK financial scandals (e.g. Maxwell and BCCI) of the early 1990s prompted the first formal corporate governance framework, the Cadbury Report (1992) . Regulatory reviews of this framework have since been undertaken regularly. The Smith Committee (2003) , which was set up after the Enron scandal, made the principal recommendations about AC engagement with external auditors and financial reporting. Prior to the Smith Committee, which followed the passing of SOX in the US, the UK corporate governance code focussed primarily on improving the internal management of the company.
The entire system of business regulation in the UK is described as a 'market-based approach' which emphasises the company-shareholder relationship (FRC 2006a) . The Financial Conduct Authority, the market regulator, requires listed companies to provide a 'comply or explain' statement in their annual report which explains how the corporate governance code has been applied by the company. In particular, an explanation is needed whenever the code's recommendations are not followed (FRC 2006a , p.7, ICAEW 2006 , an approach which differs radically from the mandatory requirements in SOX. The code provisions relevant to audit committees and financial reporting require the company board to establish an AC of at least 3 (or 2 for smaller companies) independent non-executive directors, at least one of whom has recent and relevant financial experience (FRC 2006b, §C3.1). The AC is expected to monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company, reviewing significant financial reporting judgements contained in them and discuss with the auditor issues that have been resolved and those which are unresolved. Further changes introduced in the 2012 revision require a description of the significant issues considered by the AC in the annual report (FRC 2012, §C.3.8) . These changes will begin to appear in late 2013.
Thus, the significance and remit of the AC as a means of communicating with the external auditor about financial reporting and auditing matters has grown. The AC, as a sub-committee of the main board, remains subject to influence (power) from the main board. However, UK case study evidence suggests that the influence of either individual executive board members (particularly the CEO) or of the main board acting as a group has declined as corporate governance structures have strengthened (c.f. Beattie et al. 2001 and BFH) . In addition to formal reporting by the AC to the main board, informal messages and advice occur by means of board member attendance at AC meeting (as reported in BFH 2011, p.45 (BFH 2011, pp.250-6) . Because of the complexity of IFRS, the role of the AC and the ACC also became more important in monitoring the financial statements for the benefit of the company board.
The EC proposals regarding ACs and financial reporting (EC 2011, article 31) require an AC to have one member with audit experience and one with experience in accounting or auditing. The AC should: monitor the financial reporting process and submit recommendations and proposals to ensure its integrity; monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated financial statements; supervise the completeness and integrity of the draft audit reports; and monitor the effectiveness of the undertaking's internal control, internal audit and risk management systems.
Corporate governance under different country regimes
Countries vary significantly in their economic and institutional context (La Porta et al. 2008) . Leuz (2010) analyses the different approaches to financial regulation generally, identifying institutional country clusters covering 49 countries based on 13 institutional characteristics. He argues that global convergence is unlikely due to these institutional differences and enforcement differences. The comparative corporate governance literature recognises describes two key styles (or ideal types) of national governance: the short term, outsider market-driven shareholder value model (which is seen as the AngloSaxon model and is becoming increasingly influential thorough globalisation of capital markets) and the continental European / Japanese model of a longer term, insider stakeholder-driven model (Clarke 2011 ). The former model is characterised by deep equity markets, low employee protection and common law system, whereas the latter is typified by code law, greater emphasis on bank financing and employee rights (for a detailed discussion, see García-Castro et al. 2013, pp.392-3) . Recent evidence from 26
European countries suggests that 25% of the variation in firm performance is attributable to country-level factors embedded in these corporate governance models, rather than firm-level factors (van Essen et al. 2013 ).
There are currently pressures on both. The Anglo-Saxon model is under pressure to demonstrate more social responsibility and accountability and the European-Japanese model is under pressure to be more responsive to markets and more transparent. Clarke (2011) also refers to the key differences in board structure. Some countries such as UK have a unitary board consisting of executive and non-executive directors, while others, such as Germany, have a two-tiered structure including supervisory boards involving a wider range of stakeholders. There are also differences between code law and common law countries. Davies and Schlitzer (2008) refer to the insider / outsider corporate governance system and conclude that a one size fits all approach to global governance is not necessarily the right approach. Collier and Zaman (2005) analyse the corporate governance codes in 20 European countries and conclude that the AC concept is widely accepted in countries with both unitary and two-tier governance systems, although there is considerable variation in the detailed recommendations covering structures and responsibilities. The assumption of global convergence towards the common law system in the EU with its shareholder focussed governance has been questioned by Cicon et al. (2010) . From a thematic analysis of governance codes in 23 EU countries, they find that some EU countries are diverging from the UK model. Böhm et al (2012) 
Theoretical perspectives on the role of the audit committee -boundary spanning and gatekeeping
The role of the AC has generally been explained from the perspective of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and these ideas underpin corporate governance codes in the UK and elsewhere. The AC plays a role in reducing agency costs by overseeing the effectiveness of management's financial reporting policies (e.g. Haka and Chalos 1990) .
However the generic governance literature (e.g. Barratt et al. 2002) has also identified non-executive directors as boundary spanners, a concept derived from resource dependency theory in which organisations reduce the level of environmental turbulence they face by co-opting the resources they need. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) propose that corporate boards (including presumably their sub-committees) need to be viewed from both perspectives to reflect the real world.
There is general agreement in the organisational studies literature that two distinct roles (or actions) are performed by boundary spanners: external representation and information search/processing (e.g. Aldrich and Herker 1977, Marrone 2010) . The former boundary role involves understanding and influencing the complex environment in which the organisation operates, representing the organisation and mediating between it and other external organisations and maintaining or improving the political legitimacy of the organisation. Actions include persuasion and resource-seeking. In relation to the latter role, boundary role incumbents act as a filter against environmental information overload, acting autonomously on some information and consolidating or transmitting other information. Perrone et al. (2003) note that, while boundary spanners are exposed to competing expectations from their own and external organisations, role autonomy permits discretionary behaviour and promotes trust externally. The AC promotes the legitimacy of the organisation to investors and regulators. The crucial importance of the personal characteristics of boundary spanners, in addition to institutional and organisational characteristics, is emphasised by Williams (2002) .
To our knowledge, only one study has applied the boundary spanner concept to ACs. A key external representation role of the AC is to ensure that company management has an appropriate relationship with the external auditor. Seabright et al. (1992) studied auditor-client relationships and concluded that attachments between boundary spanners play a major role in the maintenance of interorganisational relationships. While changes in clients' resource needs increase the likelihood of switching auditors, this is reduced by individual attachments of CFOs and members of AC. Attachment is the binding of one party to another through experience and as a result of investments in that relationship. Attachments that form between boundary spanners are a mechanism for reducing transaction costs but may become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism (Granovetter 1985) .
Knowledge that there will be continued interactions in the future is likely to reinforce development of attachment with more co-operative behavior. Van de Ven (1976) suggests that, over time, individual attachments, which are initially important in a relationship, may be replaced by organisational attachment.
Reflecting on the evolution of ACs in the US, Sabia and Goodfellow (2005) observe that the hierarchical, linear, corporate governance model has changed, with all parties now interacting with each other in a more dynamic and interdependent way (2005, pp. 6-11) .
In complex organisations, individual boundary spanners may be situated within a team within the organisation. In this case, the external environment refers to actors or other teams residing outside the team boundaries (in turn these may be embedded within the organisational boundary or outside that boundary). Boundary-spanning can, therefore, occur at the individual, team and organisational levels (Marrone 2010 ).
In the context of the present study, the AC, as a formal sub-committee of the main 
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A generic behavioural model of the interaction process has been developed and tested using both inductive and deductive approaches using a range of experimental, questionnaire and interview methods (e.g. Beattie et al. 2001 , Salterio 2012 ). A number of large-scale questionnaire survey studies explore auditor-company interactions on financial reporting issues (e.g. Beattie et al., 2000 in the UK; Gibbins et al., 2007 in Canada) . However these studies focus on the CFO / AP dyad and do not consider either ACCs or the AC. Consequently, these studies do not address the increasing significance of the AC role in financial reporting following the post-SOX changes. In the only study to date to cover the CFO / AP / AC triad, Beattie et al. (Cohen et al., 2002) . It is found that ACs are believed to have become significantly more active and diligent, and to possess greater expertise and power, but may play a more passive role in resolving financial reporting disputes expecting the auditors and management to resolve the issues. They conclude that the AC's role has changed from being symbolic to being an effective monitor of a company's financial reporting process, thus producing a different result from Beasley et al. (2009) by interviewing auditors rather than ACCs. Finally, Rupley et al. (2011) report that, post-SOX, US public company audit committee members believe that the features of an effective audit committee are present.
In the UK, Turley and Zaman (2007) examine interactions among key corporate governance actors using case study methods, identifying both formal and informal AC processes. They conclude that: (i) the most significant effects of the AC on governance outcomes occur outside the formal AC structures and processes; (ii) the AC has a significant influence on power relations between key organisational participants; and (iii) the AC may be used as a threat, ally or arbiter in resolving issues and conflicts.
Revisiting the approach of Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (hereafter BFB) (2001) (Bédard and Gendron 2010, p.176) . We contend that AC effectiveness is a multidimensional construct; one key dimension being AC engagement (i.e. awareness and involvement) on financial reporting issues.
DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Given the increased regulatory emphasis placed on the AC in strengthening financial reporting quality and the increasing engagement of ACs in financial reporting issues (e.g. Beasley et al. 2009) , it is to be expected that the ACC respondents should, as a minimum position, be aware of discussions concerning financial reporting (both routine discussions involving accounting policy and accounting estimates and interactions involving an element of conflict resolution). 'Awareness' of an issue following a trigger event represents the starting point for the interaction (Salterio 2012) . The ACC may become aware by being directly involved in the interaction or because other parties involved in interactions report it to them. The first research question is therefore:
RQ 1: To what extent is the ACC aware of the overall level of discussions taking place on issues related to the financial statement compared with CFOs and APs?
The level of awareness may vary according to the specific nature of the financial statement issue which is the subject of the interaction. Interaction may be informal (Turley and Zaman 2007) or the AC may operate differently according to the characteristics and behaviour of individual members (Gendron and Bédard 2006 that the AC and ACC are frequently not involved in audit-related discussions (Beattie et al. 2012) . Spira (1999) and Beasley et al. (2009) refer to the ceremonial aspect of the AC role, while Sabia and Goodfellow (2005) and BFH (2011) refer to ACs not wishing to resolve disagreements. The third research question is therefore:
RQ 3 (a): To what extent is the full AC routinely involved in discussions on issues related to the financial statements; and (b): To what extent is the ACC routinely involved in discussions on issues related to the financial statements?
A range of factors are likely to influence the parties involved in audit interactions (e.g. Bédard and Gendron 2010 , Lin and Hwang 2010 , Carcello et al. 2011 . In particular, the nature (e.g. ex ante seriousness) of the financial reporting issue and the company and auditor characteristics, which influence the structures and processes surrounding audit interactions (Beattie et al. 2012 , ICAEW / BDO 2010 , AIU 2008 
METHODS
The present study utilises experiential questionnaires which ask expert respondents about specific events they have encountered (Gibbins and Qu 2005) . Specifically it elicits the experiences and views of the three key participant groups in audit interactions: Table 1 shows the 32 issues in the order that they appeared in the questionnaire.
[ Table 1 about here]
For each of the 32 financial statement issues that had been 'the subject of discussion and/or negotiation in the most recent financial year for which your financial statements have been finalised but not necessarily published', respondents were asked: 'Which parties were involved in the discussion?', followed by four tick boxes -one each for the CFO, AP, ACC and AC. Responses explicitly related to a single year, whereas BFB (2000) asked for responses to relate to the latest three years.
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A draft questionnaire was pretested with several CFOs, ACCs and APs involved with listed companies and the content, ordering, and terminology was revised accordingly.
Questionnaires were serially numbered to allow non-respondents to be followed up, and were accompanied by an explanatory letter from the researchers which included an assurance of confidentiality of responses and a return envelope. Questionnaires to CFOs and ACCs were sent direct by the researchers in June 2007, while those to APs were distributed by the audit firms to ensure anonymity of both the APs and their clients. All AP responses were also returned direct to the researchers. Two reminders were sent to CFOs and ACCs -after 10 days and 24 days. The contact in each audit firm was asked to follow up in the same way on non-responding APs at similar time intervals.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Response rates and tests for bias
From the ACC sample 130 usable responses were received (response rate 29%), the CFO sample produced 149 usable responses (30%) and from the AP sample of 439, 219 usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 50%.
To test for response bias, responders and non-responders in the CFO and ACC groups were compared on the basis of company size and audit firm size (descriptive statistic are shown in Table 2 ). There is no significant difference in the proportion of non-Big Four affiliated respondents (χ 2 = 2.157; p = 0.340. There are, however, differences in the distribution across Stock Exchange groups (χ 2 = 16.823; p = 0.010), with a higher proportion of FTSE 350 respondents among the ACC sample. Questionnaire validity can be undermined if respondents are not knowledgeable and engaged in the relevant practices at a senior level.
As there was no evidence that this was the case 10 , we conclude that the risk of uninformed respondent bias in this sample is minimal.
[ Table 2 about here]
Awareness of discussions on financial statement issues (RQ 1 and RQ 2)
The mean, standard deviation, and median number of issues cited for each respondent type is summarised in Table 3 . Discussion may comprise a simple exchange of information, such as the provision of advice from the auditor on complex or new technical matters. It may also involve elucidation and confirmation in support of the attest function. An individual might be aware that a discussion took place between two or more other parties without being directly involved themselves. Table 3 indicates that, as a group, ACCs cited a slightly higher mean number of issues discussed then the other two respondent groups, although their median was the lowest indicating a skewed distribution with possible outliers at the top end. However both measures of central tendency for ACCs are broadly in line with those for the other respondent groups, although the standard deviation indicates a larger variation in responses than for CFOs and APs. In response to RQ 1, ACCs' overall level of awareness of financial reporting discussions is comparable to that of CFOs and APs. Since a lack of awareness of issues would indicate incomplete information search activities by the ACC, it may be inferred from this that the ACC is fulfilling their individual boundary-spanning role in relation to information search on behalf of the full AC.
[ Table 3 about here]
For each respondent group, the infrequency with which each of the 32 issues relating to the production of annual financial statements is reported by each group as being discussed is shown in Table 4 . To focus on those issues not discussed, issues are shown in increasing frequency. The ordering is based on the ACC group, with frequency ranks shown for each group.
[ Table 4 about here]
The least frequently cited issues for discussion show little variation between the three respondent groups and it is noticeable that the ACCs tended to report discussion of these items at least as frequently as the other respondent groups. Only three of the ten issues least frequently cited by ACCs were cited by a higher percentage of APs or CFOs. It is of note that several of the least discussed issues would be considered fundamental to the quality of financial reporting (e.g. 'substance over form/ true and fair view issues', 'maintenance of proper accounting transactions', 'going concern') but would not be expected to be an explicit feature of every audit. At the other end of the Table 4 , the most frequent issues for discussion also vary little between the three respondent groups. Three issues relating to business combinations ('intangible assets / goodwill', 'fair value on acquisition' and 'issues in subsidiary undertakings') feature for all groups and may have been used interchangeably by respondents. This high ranking may be attributed to the requirement in IFRS 3 that identifiable intangible assets must be recognised on acquisition. This requirement was new at the time and controversial (BFH 2011). Presentation of primary statements was ranked joint second by ACCs (in common with APs) along with exceptional items (also ranked within the top ten by the other two groups). This is an area where IFRS is less restrictive than UK GAAP, as IAS 1 permits flexibility in the presentation of the income statement; this major change is likely to have provoked discussion on, for example, the presentation of reorganisation costs (BFH 2011).
There is broad agreement between the three groups on the frequency of issues discussed.
Out of a possible 32 issues, only eight are significantly different (at the 5% level) between groups, but all of them involve ACCs and at least one other group. In particular, ACCs are significantly less likely than APs to cite share based payments, issues in subsidiary undertakings and fraud and illegal acts as a discussion issue. In relation to these three issues, ACCs show a similar level of awareness of such issues as CFOs (though not APs), suggesting that they are only in part fulfilling the information search role in relation to these important issues.
There are five issues significantly more likely to be cited by the ACCs than at least one other group. These are: issues in associates and joint ventures, maintenance of proper accounting records (cited by APs), identification of pre / post acquisition expenses, related party transactions (cited by CFOs) and prior year adjustments (both groups). In BFB (2000) it was apparent that APs tended to emphasise narrower compliance issues rather than those involving commercial judgement. Such a trend is not apparent in this study.
In response to RQ 2 for many specific issues the ACC's level of awareness is similar to the other respondent groups. It can be concluded that the ACC is, in general, satisfactorily performing their information search boundary role. However, there are several significant differences which do not have an obvious explanation. These may, at least in part, be attributable to the noise introduced by unmatched samples.
Parties involved in interactions (RQ 3 and RQ 4(a))
The questionnaire asked respondents to indicate, by means of four tick boxes, whether or not each of the following four key individuals/groups were involved in discussions:
CFO, AP, ACC and AC. It is not only the presence/absence of each key party that is of interest, it is also the particular configuration of parties. Given this format, there are 16 possible combinations of responses for each financial reporting issue listed. If none of the four parties was involved, this means that there was no discussion in relation to that issue, leaving 15 combinations that indicate discussion occurred. If only one of the four parties was involved, this can be interpreted as meaning that discussions were held with parties outside the four listed (e.g. company management or directors other than the CFO and AC members, members of the audit team or audit firm other than the AP, other outside parties, such as legal advisors, partner from another audit firm, etc.).
Across all potential discussion issues, the combined sample reported 5,445 discussions.
The parties involved in these discussions are shown in Table 5 , which reports frequencies for the 15 combinations. The most common set of parties involved in discussions was all four (37%), followed by the CFO / AP dyad (28%). Detailed results by company size and audit firm tier are shown in the Appendix.
[ Table 5 about here]
To facilitate further analysis of this data (Tables 6), we focussed on the two groupings of the reported combinations considered to be of the greatest interest. The groupings are as follows:
• No AC or ACC (both the full AC and the ACC left out, i.e. combinations 1, 2 and 5 shown in Table 5 );
• Presence of ACC but absence of full AC in discussion (i.e. combinations 3, 6, 8 and 11) [ Table 6 about here] Table 6 shows, for each financial reporting issue included on the questionnaire, the percentage of discussions occurring for both key groupings for the combined sample.
The 32 issues are organised into four issue categories: consolidation matters; primary statement issues; other accounting issues; and compliance and regulation. To provide context, the final column shows the incidence of discussions. Thus, for the first issue, 63.3% of respondents reported awareness of a discussion regarding issues in subsidiary undertakings; of these discussions, 39.7% did not involve either the AC or ACC and 7.0% involved the ACC but not the full AC. The final two rows of Table 6 show the number and percentage aggregated across all issues.
It can be seen that 35.3% of discussions do not involve either the AC or the ACC, indicating a lack of any active AC engagement in over one-third of interactions. Thus, boundary-spanning involvement in either or both of the roles of external representation and information search and processing is absent at both the individual and team levels.
We suggest that ACCs may perform an information processing role in relation to themselves, by filtering out issues where they elect not to become involved. This may be because they recognise that their time available for AC activities is limited and therefore must be rationed. Rationing will most affect issues where the ACC believes that they do not have superior technical or business knowledge to the CFO / AP dyad and which are successfully resolved by this dyad. Such issues are unlikely to result in AC engagement due to the gatekeeping role of the ACC.
This 35.3% level of AC/ACC non-engagement is markedly higher than the 25% nonengagement of AC/ACC in audit-related issues in the Beattie et al. (2012) study. This may be because the various audit-related roles and responsibilities of the AC are detailed explicitly, whereas the responsibilities in relation to financial reporting issues are mentioned more generically. Moving on to distinguish the individual ACC from the full ACC, 6.0% of interactions involve the ACC but not the AC. This is consistent with the view that ACCs perform, in a significant minority of interactions, an individual information processing (gatekeeping) boundary role (Marrone 2010 ) with respect to the AC, blocking, filtering, transmitting or summarising information as they see fit. This is a lower level than found by Beattie et al. (2012) for audit-related issues (6% c.f. 11%).
In response to RQ 3 (a) and (b) the evidence suggests that the AC and ACC are not fully engaged in discussions on all aspects of financial reporting decision-making. However, given that the ACCs' level of awareness of interactions is broadly the same as that of the other groups, it may be inferred that, while ACCs want to be kept informed, they do not expect to be routinely involved in decision making. This is consistent with the findings from the case studies within BFH (2011). The lack of ACC and AC involvement also suggests that an AC or an ACC may, rather than engaging in active decision-making, fulfil a passive ceremonial type role (Turley and Zaman 2007) and review and approve an issue without any discussion or questioning.
Turning to the detail in Table 6 , a number of observations can be made from inspection of this table. The issues which are most likely to involve the ACC but not the AC are 'requirements of listing rules prescribed by the FSA', 'matters arising from compliance with the Companies Act and other accounting standards', 'statements in the annual report concerning compliance with the Combined Code', 'exceptional items' and 'fair value on acquisition' (each with a percentage between 9.0% and 9.6%). The ACC is often the member of the AC with recent and relevant financial experience and might be expected to deal with narrow issues of compliance where other members of the AC with broader business knowledge might have less to contribute. The first three of these issues are from the 'compliance and regulatory issues' section of the questionnaire and would appear to fit this description, although it might be expected that the full AC should be concerned with how corporate governance activities are reported.
The two issues for which discussions are most likely to exclude both the ACC and AC are consolidation matters. However the matters concerned ('dividends from subsidiaries' and 'identification of pre/post acquisition expenses') are relatively uncontroversial. There is no obvious pattern for the other issues where AC / ACC are involved less frequently. At the other end of the scale it is not surprising that they are least likely to excluded from discussions about 'fraud and illegal acts', 'going concern'
and 'statements in the annual report concerning compliance with the Combined Code' as these cover fundamental AC responsibilities. In response to RQ 4(a), it would appear that the nature of the financial reporting issue does have an impact on the parties involved in interactions. The absence of any full AC or ACC involvement ranges from 62% (dividends from subsidiaries) down to 17% (fraud and illegal acts).
Further analysis revealed that the parties involved reported, as reported by ACC respondents, are significantly different from those reported by the other two respondent groups. The ACCs report significantly fewer discussions than the CFOs or APs where neither they nor the full AC is involved (21%, 45% and 38%, respectively; χ 2 =209.5, sig < 0.01). They also report more interactions where the ACC but not the full AC is involved (9%, 5% and 5%, respectively; χ 2 =26.4, sig < 0.01). Given that the ACCs reported substantially the same number of discussions as the other two groups (see Table   3 , row 1), this does seem to suggest that the perceptions/recollections of parties involved varies across the respondent groups rather than there being discussions of which the ACC is simply unaware. Previous research into the reported level of issue negotiation by APs and CFOs has found that APs report a higher level, attributing this to the relatively higher incentives of APs to recall and declare such interactions (Beattie et al. 2000, p.199) . Similarly, ACCs are likely to be more sensitive than either APs or CFOs to their explicit responsibility in relation to significant accounting issues, causing them to report higher levels of engagement. Another (not mutually exclusive) explanation is that, despite the large sample sizes, the findings reflect random noise rather than a systematic effect. The unmatched nature of the samples exacerbates the noise in the data.
Influences on parties involved (RQ 4(b) and (c))
The relationship between the incidence of particular groupings and the background characteristics of company size and audit firm size is examined in Table 7 , panels (a) and (b), respectively. While it is well-established that there is a strong positive correlation between company size and audit firm size (Moizer and Turley 1987, p.120) , both variables are examined since distinct organisational practices (company-side or audit firm-side) can influence the parties involved in discussions.
In addition to the two groupings shown in Table 6 , five other groupings are presented as follows:
• ACC but no AC (combinations 3, 6, 8 and 11);
• No AP or AC (both the AP and the full AC left out, i.e. combinations 1, 3 and 6);
• No CFO (the CFO is left out, i.e. combinations 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10 and 14);
• All in (none of the four key parties is left out, with ACC acting either as part of the full AC or separately from it as an individual, i.e. combinations 12 and 15);
• No AC (the full AC is left out, i.e. combinations 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 11); and
• No AP (the AP left out, i.e. combinations 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10 and 13).
[ Table 7 (Beattie et al. 2000 , Gibbins et al. 2007 ). The present study complements the limited extant case study research on the CFO / AP / AC triad (Beattie et al. 2011, Salleh and Stewart 2012) by providing large sample evidence that can be generalised to the population of interest. This population comprises listed companies operating in post-IFRS adoption, post-SOX, Anglo-Saxon corporate governance environments. This evidence reveals how crucial existing AC responsibilities are being discharged, offering a valuable baseline for future academic research and policy-making.
By means of an experiential questionnaire survey of the three principal parties in the financial reporting interaction process (CFOs, APs and ACCs), the nature and extent of engagement of AC in financial reporting issues is investigated. AC engagement in these interactions is conceived as a two-stage process comprising awareness and involvement.
The ACC (and the AC) are viewed as fulfilling the role of boundary spanners, a theoretical construct drawn from the organisational studies literature. Moreover, the ACC fulfils an additional gatekeeping role with respect to the AC and the main board.
AC effectiveness is a multidimensional construct and its evaluation is acknowledged to be difficult (Bédard and Gendron 2010) . We contend that, in additional to investigating publicly observable AC dimensions such as meeting frequency, a dimension of central importance is AC engagement (i.e. awareness and involvement) on financial reporting issues. Following Beattie et al. (2012) , the involvement of the ACC is considered separately from the full AC.
It is found that ACCs' overall level of awareness of discussions of financial reporting issues was comparable to that of CFOs and APs (the median number of issues is 10, 10 and 11, respectively). Their level of awareness of specific issues was also broadly in line with CFOs and APs (there was no significant difference for 75% of the issues). For those eight issues where a significant difference did exist, no systematic explanation was apparent.
One surprise was that ACCs were significantly less likely than APs to be aware of discussions on fraud and illegal acts, given that they are charged with specific responsibilities in this area under the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2006b ).
This is of particular interest as it is also an internal control and risk-related matter of concern to the EC (2011).
Across 5,445 reported discussions, 35.3% did not involve either the AC or the ACC, Thus, in over one-third of discussion, the AC fulfilled no boundary spanning role (in most of these cases, the interaction involved the traditional CFO / AP dyad. These findings indicate that neither the AC nor the ACC were fully engaged in all aspects of financial reporting decision-making. However it is clear from qualitative, case study evidence (BFH 2011) that ACCs do not expect to be involved in routine decision making. Fundamental financial reporting issues such as fraud and going concern were most likely to involve ACs and ACCs. The present study finds a markedly higher overall level of non-involvement of the AC in financial reporting interactions (35%) compared to the Beattie et al. (2012) study's findings regarding non-involvement of the AC in audit-related tasks and responsibilities (25%). This provides further evidence of partial engagement, supporting the conclusion of Beattie et al. (2012) regulators should be cautious about giving ACs additional responsibilities.
The significant minority of cases (6.0%) where the ACC but not the AC was involved reveal situations where the ACC acts as a boundary spanning gatekeeper to the full AC (Coffee 2006) . These cases are indicative of informal AC processes, such as found in prior research (Gendron and Bédard 2006 , Turley and Zaman 2007 , BFH 2012 . There was some evidence that ACCs were more likely to be involved without other members of the AC on compliance and regulatory issues. The significant lack of engagement by the AC is consistent with the findings of KPMG in relation to AC involvement in judgments and estimates (2010; 2013) . ACC respondents reported significantly fewer discussions than the other two respondent groups where neither they nor the full AC was involved, suggesting that the perceptions/recollections of parties involved varied across the respondent groups (although the number of recalled discussions did not).
The relationship between the incidence of particular parties involved and background characteristics revealed several significant associations. Respondents affiliated with large listed companies were more likely to report 'All in' and, interestingly, 'No CFO'.
The latter finding is, however, based on a very small number of instances. It is hard to believe that the CFO is not involved in all financial reporting issues. Non-FTSE 350 companies were more likely to report that ACCs acted without the rest of the AC. Big
Four affiliated respondents were significantly more likely to report 'All in' and less likely to report either 'ACC but no AC' or 'No AC', but there were relatively few significant differences suggesting only a marginal impact.
The results indicate that not all financial reporting issues are dealt with in the same way and that discussions may involve different parties depending on the nature of the issue, the size of the company and to a lesser extent, the size of the audit firm. A substantial proportion of discussions of financial reporting issues do not involve the ACC as an individual separate from the AC and many do not involve the full AC. Given that the AC can be viewed as a boundary spanning group with a key role interceding between management and the AP, their absence from many discussions must be a potential cause for concern. BFH (2011) found a marked improvement in the quality of interaction outcomes compared with the earlier BFB (2001) case studies, conducted before ACs were given an enhanced role within the regulatory framework. The nature of this survey study does not permit investigation into the significance to the financial statements of the issues of which the various parties were aware, but did not discuss. It is possible that issues may be approved or agreed by the ACC or the AC without discussion. Another interpretation is that the AC exerted a passive role in encouraging APs and CFOs to resolve disputes between themselves (Cohen et al. 2010) . Attachments that have formed between boundary spanners may have produced expectations of trust so that ACCs and ACs believe that CFOs and APs will generally act constructively rather than opportunistically (Seabright et al., 1992; Granovetter, 1985) . If the attachment is at the organisational level, then the rotation of APs or the departure of other boundary spanners may not be significant (van de Ven, 1976) .
BFH (2011) found that, while ACCs were keen to be updated on problem areas to avoid surprises, they expected CFOs (with superior business knowledge) and APs (with superior technical accounting knowledge) to be able to resolve most issues between themselves. It is also possible that some financial reporting issues are very complex for an AC with possibly only one member with recent and relevant financial experience, although discussions on other issues might benefit from contributions from members with broader business experience (Cohen et al. 2008) .
The less than full engagement by ACs and ACCs in financial reporting interactions revealed by this research will be of interest to regulators as they consider further developments to the role of ACs and ACCs following the financial crisis. The evidence of the ACC performing a gatekeeper role in relation to the full AC, particularly in smaller companies is a matter of concern if the distinction between management and monitoring becomes blurred and the independence of non-executive directors (NEDs) and the level of trust associated with them (Perrone et al. 2003) is brought into question.
The absence of engagement by either the ACC or the AC in slightly over one third of financial reporting discussion interactions suggests that caution should be exercised by regulators in expecting too much of an ACC and AC in financial reporting matters.
While passive 'awareness' may be adequate in relation to some issues, the finding that in 17.2% of discussions about fraud and illegal acts neither the ACC nor the AC is involved does give cause for concern. This issue is a named responsibility of the AC in the Combined Code where active involvement would be expected. The findings also raise the question of whether one set of regulations is appropriate and practical for companies of all sizes, or whether FTSE 350 companies should be considered separately.
There are other potential dangers in extending the responsibilities of ACs and ACCs. Perrone et al. (2003) As with all research the present study has inevitable limitations. In particular, the questionnaire approach brings response noise and potential response biases. However, these risks are mitigated by the seniority of the respondents (minimal risk of uninformed respondent bias) and the relatively high response rate obtained. (2007) consider Spain. 6 While the mean reported incidence of discussions was found to be broadly similar across the three respondent groups, 11% of discussions involve the ACC only, rather than the full AC, and a further 25% do not involve any member of the AC. 7 Four weeks prior to mailing the questionnaire, the names and addresses of companies, CFOs and ACCs were checked and where necessary corrected using Regulatory News Service data (which requires prompt announcement of changes in board and directorate membership). 8. A fifth group of 2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act issues and one item relating to regulated industries are excluded from the present paper as they do not apply to all companies. 9. BFB (2000) used a longer three year period to ensure that some negotiation activity was picked up by the questionnaire. In the present study, a single year was used as, based on the evidence in BFB, this would generate sufficient levels of negotiation to be informative and to avoid straddling pre-and post IFRS implementation. 10. ACC respondents were all audit committee chairs, with the exception of two who were Deputy Chairs; AP respondents were all listed company audit engagement partners (4 responses were eliminated as they did not fall within the criteria set for the following reasons: client reported under US GAAP only, client not yet on IFRS (AIM company), AP audited investment trusts only; and client was a public sector organisation); CFO respondents, based on job title, were FD/Group FD/CFO (74%), financial controller (9%), (group) chief accountant (3%), deputy FD (1%) and other/non stated (13%). 
